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I. INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional privacy law in Europe and the United States establishes the 
right to privacy as freedom from government surveillance.1 It is based on 
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 1 A note about terminology: We refer to privacy protections under the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as the European Convention of Human Rights 
as “constitutional privacy.” Another term, more commonly used in Europe, for these laws is 
“fundamental rights” protection. The defining characteristic of “constitutional privacy” is 
protection from unlawful or disproportionate government surveillance. Protection of privacy, 
much like any fundamental right, is not absolute; it is balanced against other fundamental 
rights (e.g., freedom of speech) and important public interests (e.g., national security and law 
enforcement and freedom of information). Information privacy, which we contrast with 
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suspicion of power and distrust in the state, which can unleash ominous 
intrusions into the private sphere to crush dissent and stifle democratic 
discourse and free speech. Over the past forty years, an additional legal 
framework has emerged to protect information privacy. Yet unlike the 
constitutional framework, information privacy law provides little protection 
against the risk of surveillance by either governments or private sector entities. 
Indeed, such organizations are assumed to be trusted entities acting as stewards 
of individuals’ rights, essentially “information fiduciaries.”2 
This Article demonstrates that an analysis of the assumptions and principles 
underlining privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) highlights the gap between 
the constitutional and information privacy frameworks. It argues that by 
embracing PETs, information privacy law can recalibrate to better protect 
individuals from surveillance and unwanted intrusions into their private lives.  
Conversely, if the law continues on its current trajectory, emphasizing 
organizational accountability and marginalizing data minimization and 
transparency, PETs would become unviable and individuals would become 
subject to increasingly stifling digital oversight. The recent revelations about the 
scope and depth of mass surveillance employed by the NSA and partner 
intelligence agencies have painted a grim picture concerning the state of privacy 
in the digital world. 
The term “PETs” has been used loosely to describe a broad range of privacy 
technologies. In this Article, it is restricted to technologies specifically aimed at 
enabling individuals to engage in online activities free from surveillance and 
interference. PETs allow individuals to determine what information they 
disclose and to whom, so that only information they explicitly share is available 
to intended recipients. They are based on three common principles: eliminating 
the single point of failure inherent in a single trusted data controller, minimizing 
data collection, and subjecting system protocols to community based public 
scrutiny. 
This Article shows that while PETs are aligned with the objectives of the 
constitutional framework, they are not always in tune with the assumptions, 
principles, and goals of the information privacy framework. Over the past two 
decades, the information privacy framework has shifted to imposing 
information stewardship (“accountability”) obligations on data controllers, who 
act as custodians of personal data. The notion of the data controller as a trusted 
party is ill at ease with the anti-surveillance gist of constitutional privacy and 
                                                                                                                       
constitutional privacy, also has strong constitutional (or fundamental right) properties. In 
Europe, it is protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
various national constitutions. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 
2000 O.J. (C 364) 10. Yet, as discussed below, it harbors assumptions that are incongruent 
with—and indeed may be diametrically opposed to—those of the constitutional privacy 
framework. 
 2 Ian Brown points out that this may be an overstatement as far as the European 
information privacy framework is concerned. The Article addresses this tension, infra notes 
23–24 and accompanying text. 
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PETs. In fact, the technological community researching PETs departs from a 
diametrically opposed perception of a data controller as an adversary. Under 
this approach, information disclosed to a data controller is compromised and 
can no longer be viewed as private. Proponents of this view point out that after 
disclosure, it is almost impossible to control how personal information is used, 
concluding that PETs should limit information disclosure. 
This Article asserts that policymakers should recognize and expand by 
appropriate regulatory measures the role of technologies that enable individuals 
to enforce their right to privacy as freedom from surveillance. Given that the 
legal framework is focused on the roles and obligations of data controllers, this 
Article categorizes PETs depending on the degree of data controller 
involvement.  
The first category consists of PETs that require active implementation by a 
data controller. This includes PETs, such as private information retrieval or 
zero-knowledge protocols, which enable a data controller to provide a service 
that takes as input private user information without the controller becoming 
privy to such information. Yet if the controller does not invest in a privacy 
enhancing architecture that integrates these protocols, individuals cannot by 
themselves benefit from the privacy protections afforded by them. The second 
category comprises client-side software deployed by a user while using a 
service offered by a data controller. These include encryption tools that 
maintain the confidentiality of the contents of emails or social networking posts, 
including vis-à-vis the data controller, and proxies that enable users to 
anonymously access an online service. Here, controller implementation is not 
required; yet data controllers offering an online service can (and actually do) try 
to limit deployment of PETs within their service. The third category consists of 
PETs, which are collaborative applications where users act as the service 
providers, that is, without the involvement of an actual data controller in the 
provision of the service. For example, the Tor network relies on a decentralized 
architecture run by volunteers to enable users to communicate anonymously. 
We note, however, that collaborative applications rely on the Internet 
infrastructure for their communications. Thus, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
have the ability to prevent users from accessing and participating in these 
services. The recent NSA revelations have shown that powerful national 
security agencies, including the NSA and British GCHQ, have invested 
significant effort in trying to undermine Tor.3 This comes in addition to reports 
of governments in various countries trying to block the use of Tor.4 
                                                                                                                       
 3 James Ball, Bruce Schneier & Glenn Greenwald, NSA and GCHQ Target Tor 
Network That Protects Anonymity of Web Users, GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2013, http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption. 
 4 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Police in Japan Are Asking ISPs To Start Blocking Tor, 
TECH DIRT (Apr. 19, 2013, 5:04 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130418/ 
17210122754/police-japan-want-isps-to-block-tor.shtml; see also Censorship Wiki, TOR, 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OONI/censorshipwiki (last visited Oct. 9, 
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After classifying the PETs and examining their trust assumptions, design 
principles, objectives, and strategies, this Article assesses the policy 
considerations involved in reforming the legal framework to tolerate, facilitate, 
or indeed mandate their use. This Article concludes by arguing that the current 
information privacy framework fails to adequately address surveillance 
concerns. Embracing PETs would signal a marked departure from government 
efforts to disrupt and prevent their widespread deployment.5 Such an approach 
would recalibrate public policy to focus on core concerns that underlie the 
genesis of information privacy law on the ruins of totalitarian regimes in 
twentieth-century Europe. 
II. THE AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT OF “TRUST” IN PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS 
The recent revelations over the massive scope of data collection, analysis, 
and use by the NSA and similar national security organizations6 have 
crystallized privacy advocates’ concerns of “sleepwalking into a surveillance 
society.”7 Over the course of the twentieth century, Europe has been torn by 
wave after wave of totalitarian regimes terrorizing their populations with 
elaborate infrastructures of mass surveillance.8 Much like the prisoners in 
Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon,9 citizens of a surveillance society inhibit their 
speech, behavior, political participation, religious beliefs, social interactions, 
and life aspirations, in the face of what Michel Foucault called the police state’s 
“disciplinary gaze.”10 The human rights abuses of the Gestapo in Germany, 
KGB in the USSR, and the Stasi in East Germany are a testament to the 
ominous risks of excessive intelligence agencies’ powers turned against their 
                                                                                                                       
2013) (documenting attempts to censor access to the Tor network in China, Iran, Kazakhstan 
and Syria). 
 5 See Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able To Foil Basic 
Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html.  
 6 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon 
Customers Daily, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/ 
nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism 
Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.  
 7 Press Release, Info. Comm’r Office, Waking Up to a Surveillance Society (Nov. 2, 
2006), available at http://www.ico.org.uk/upload/documents/pressreleases/2006/waking_up 
_to_a_surveillance_society.pdf. 
 8 See Edward J. Eberle, The Right to Information Self Determination, 2001 UTAH L. 
REV. 965, 975–76; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 
1934 (2013). 
 9 Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon; or, the Inspection-House, in JEREMY BENTHAM, THE 
PANOPTICON WRITINGS 29, 35–37 (Miran Božovič ed., 1995).  
 10 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 174 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1977). See generally Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the 
Machine: Does Airport Scanning Violate Privacy?, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263 (2013). 
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own citizenry and portraying dissent as “terrorism” or “mutiny.”11 Moreover, as 
individuals’ daily lives have increasingly become mediated by mass-market 
technologies, the government apparatus has joined private sector entities to 
create a “surveillant assemblage.”12 The specter of a government–business 
handshake, long recognized in academic scholarship, has become salient with 
the striking revelations about the collaboration of telecom and online providers 
with intelligence agencies in the PRISM and telecom metadata cases,13 as well 
as the introduction by vendors—at the behest of the NSA—of backdoors and 
security vulnerabilities into their software and hardware products.14 
The law has historically responded to the risks of government surveillance 
with constitutional protections for the right to privacy. For the past sixty years 
in Europe, privacy was considered a fundamental human right. Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) limits the power of the state to 
interfere in citizens’ privacy, “except such as is in accordance with the law and 
is necessary in a democratic society.”15 Constitutional privacy protection is also 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
provides for “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”16 Hence, both 
the ECHR and the U.S. Constitution establish the right to privacy at a high level 
of abstraction as freedom from undue government surveillance. For differing 
historical and cultural reasons—the harsh lessons of tyranny in Europe and the 
endemic suspicion of government in the United States17—the constitutional 
frameworks on both sides of the Atlantic view centralized power with distrust 
and require effective checks, balances, and safeguards. 
Protections from surveillance risks have arisen not only in law but also in 
technology. New tools and systems have been developed to ensure that 
                                                                                                                       
 11 See, e.g., PHILIPP FREIHERR VON BOESELAGER WITH FLORENCE & JÉRÔME 
FEHRENBACH, VALKYRIE: THE STORY OF THE PLOT TO KILL HITLER, BY ITS LAST MEMBER 
163–73 (Steven Rendall trans., 2009).  
 12 Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. 
SOCIOLOGY 605, 608–09 (2000) (building on concepts developed in GILLES DELEUZE & 
FÉLIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS 385–87 (Brian Massumi trans., 1987)). See 
generally Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern 
Surveillance: An Analysis of Innovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques, 74 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1071 (2013). 
 13 See Waking Up to a Surveillance Society, supra note 7. 
 14 But see Glenn Greenwald et al., Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted 
Messages, GUARDIAN, July 11, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/micro 
soft-nsa-collaboration-user-data.  
 15 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, 
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5. This formulation was repeated fifty years later in Article 7 of the 
European Union’s Charter on Fundamental Rights. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, supra note 1, art. 7. The Charter came into force under the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Treaty of Lisbon art. 6, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 13.  
 16 U.S. Const. amend IV. 
 17 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1189, 1211 (2004). 
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individuals can create an autonomous sphere free of surveillance. These 
mechanisms are known in the engineering community as PETs.18 While the 
term PETs has been used loosely to describe a broad range of privacy 
technologies,19 this Article uses it to mean technologies specifically aimed to 
protect individuals’ communications and personal information from 
surveillance and interference. PETs allow individuals to determine what 
information they disclose and to whom, so that only information they explicitly 
share is available to intended recipients. 
Over the past forty years, a specific regulatory framework has emerged to 
protect information privacy.20 Unlike the constitutional framework, which 
remains at a high level of abstraction and has roots going back more than two 
                                                                                                                       
 18 Herbert Burkert, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision¸ in 
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 125, 125 (Philip E. Agre & Marc 
Rotenberg eds., 1997). 
 19 See, e.g., Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1409, 1420–21 (2011) (categorizing ad-preference, cookie managers, advertising icons, and 
“do not track” tools as PETs).  
 20 The first version of the fair information practice principles appeared in the United 
States, in a 1973 report sponsored by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW). DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL 
DATA SYSTEMS xxiii–xxxv (1973). The main building blocks of the current framework 
consist of the Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, C(80)58/FINAL (Sept. 23, 
1980) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines], available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/ 
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm; Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data art. 
1, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108; Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; and, in the United States, a collection of 
sector specific legislation including the Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (financial information); the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681–2728 (children’s 
information); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (health information); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 
88 Stat. 1896 (personal information collected by the Federal government). All of the major 
frameworks are undergoing review. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.euro 
pa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf; THE WHITE 
HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 1–3 
(2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf; FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS iii–vi (2012), available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. See generally Andrew Clearwater & J. 
Trevor Hughes, In the Beginning . . . An Early History of the Privacy Profession, 74 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 897 (2013). 
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centuries (in the case of the United States), information privacy law is a 
construct of the technological age.21 Alas, as currently interpreted, it provides 
little protection against the risk of surveillance and interference by either 
government—which benefits from explicit exemptions—or private sector 
organizations, which are assumed to be trusted parties.22 
The legal framework for protection of information privacy is organized 
around a set of “fair information practice principles” (FIPPs), which apply to 
“data controllers,” business or government organizations that collect, store, use 
or disclose personal information. The FIPPs contain an inner tension between 
principles that assume that data controllers are trusted entities, cognizant and 
respectful of individual rights (e.g., the principles of choice, purpose limitation, 
security and accountability), and principles that, in a similar vein to the 
constitutional framework, treat data controllers with distrust (namely data 
minimization and collection limitation).23 In recent years, with the advent of 
“big data” and increasing pervasiveness of computing in everyday life, data 
minimization requirements together with the attendant “distrust” assumption, 
have been marginalized, making room for an emphasis on “notice and choice” 
and “accountability.”24 
While Alan Westin’s canonical conceptualization of privacy concerns 
individual control over information,25 the FIPPs provide individuals with very 
little de facto control, usually presented as “notice and choice.”26 This means 
that controllers are obligated to be “transparent” with respect to their 
information practices and to offer individuals choices concerning the scope of 
information collection and use. In reality, however, notice and choice is of little 
consequence for users.27 Individuals fail to review, let alone understand, 
                                                                                                                       
 21 Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 24, 27 (2012).  
 22 To be sure, private sector entities are not blindly trusted, as they are laden with 
auditing requirements and regulatory oversight. Yet the thrust of the information privacy 
framework, as applied and interpreted in practice, is conditioned on a high degree of trust, 
particularly when contrasted with the assumptions made by the engineering community. 
 23 For the sake of simplicity, this Article calls both of these principles “data 
minimization.” See generally Bartosz M. Marcinkowski, Privacy Paradox(es): In Search of 
a Transatlantic Data Protection Standard, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1167 (2013). 
 24 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the 
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 242, 260 (2013); see also Danielle 
Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1249–58, 1281–82 
(2008). 
 25 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 26 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE ii–iii, 4 (2000) (focusing on the principles of notice, choice, 
access, and security).  
 27 See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-management and the Consent 
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883 (2013); Pedro Giovanni Leon et al., What Do 
Online Behavioral Advertising Privacy Disclosures Communicate to Users?, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2012 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC SOCIETY 19, 
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organizations’ information disclosures; and choice is rarely truly voluntary, 
informed, and meaningful.28 Transparency, too, leaves much to be desired, with 
industry data analysis techniques remaining opaque and mired by a veil of 
secrecy.29 
Another pervasive aspect of information privacy law includes a focus on 
anonymization (also known in some policy circles as de-identification)30 of 
personal information, a method viewed skeptically by proponents of PETs given 
its well-documented technical shortcomings.31 The current debate around the 
specifics of a “Do Not Track” (DNT) standard to curb online tracking32 
highlights the fragility of notice, choice, and anonymization. Even in the best-
case scenario, if industry players broadly agreed upon a DNT standard, it would 
remain subject to the goodwill of layers upon layers of information 
intermediaries who have no relationships with individual data subjects and are 
subject to little oversight or accountability controls.33 
Given the fickle controls on information collection, the legal framework has 
shifted to imposing information stewardship obligations on data controllers, 
who act as custodians of personal information. These obligations, increasingly 
grouped under the title “accountability,” include devising a privacy compliance 
program; appointing a chief privacy officer; conducting “privacy impact 
                                                                                                                       
27 (2012), available at http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab1200 
8.pdf.  
 28 Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE “INFORMATION ECONOMY” 341, 358–67 (Jane K. Winn ed., 
2006); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 657 (2011). 
 29 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the Age 
of Big Data, 11 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2013); see also Neil M. 
Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 
42–43 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/66_StanL 
RevOnline_41_RichardsKing.pdf. 
 30 See, e.g., Robert Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative and 
Contractual Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33, 33–34 (2010).  
 31 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716 (2010); see also Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly 
Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON 
SECURITY & PRIVACY 111, 124 (May 18–21, 2008).  
 32 See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing 
Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 281, 284–86, 334–35 (2012); see also Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A 
Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 
1234–37 (2013). 
 33 Mike Perry, Do Not Beg: Moving Beyond DNT Through Privacy by Design 1–2 
(presented at the W3C Workshop: Do Not Track and Beyond, Nov. 26–27, 2012), available 
at http://www.w3.org/2012/dnt-ws/position-papers/21.pdf (“[E]very privacy property that 
DNT:1 aims to provide through regulatory enforcement can be better provided through 
technical changes to browser and network behavior during private browsing modes. We 
therefore suggest that the W3C standards body focus on standardizing these technical 
measures, rather than attempting to broker negotiations over regulatory policy and law.”).  
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assessments;” notifying regulators and individuals about data security breaches; 
maintaining a record retention policy; and more.34 A network of privacy 
enforcement authorities oversees compliance; although outside the United 
States, enforcement actions have seldom amounted to a disruption of business 
practices.35 
Accountability measures implicitly assume that the data controller is a 
trusted party, essentially a fiduciary for individual rights. Even the concept of 
“privacy by design,” which some initially thought was meant to embed 
principles of data minimization and anonymization into product engineering, is 
increasingly translated to introducing FIPPs compliance into organizational 
processes.36 In other words, privacy by design too has become an 
“accountability” tool, which assumes data controllers are duly incentivized to 
protect individual rights. 
The notion of the data controller as a trusted party is ill at ease with the anti-
surveillance gist of constitutional privacy, the FIPPs’ principle of data 
minimization, and PETs. The technological community researching PETs 
departs from a diametrically opposed perception of a data controller, that of an 
adversary.37 Under this approach, information disclosed to a data controller is 
compromised and can no longer be viewed as private, given that the data 
controller itself may subject individuals to persistent surveillance. Moreover, 
data controllers may breach their accountability obligations even without 
intending to do so, for example, in cases of data breach, coerced government 
access,38 or wrongdoing by a rogue employee. The assumption underlying PETs 
is that once a data controller collects personal information it can—or may be 
forced to—use it in unforeseen ways, possibly to the detriment of the 
individuals concerned. Proponents of this view point out that after disclosure, it 
is almost impossible to control how personal information is used, concluding 
that PETs should prevent—or at least limit—information disclosure. 
In stark contrast to information privacy law, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
“third party doctrine” has traditionally regarded data controllers as inherently 
                                                                                                                       
 34 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 03/2010 on the Principle of 
Accountability, 00062/10/EN. WP 173, at 3, 4, 7, 11, 12 (July 13, 2010).  
 35 Consider the resolution of the investigation of Facebook’s data practices by the Irish 
data protection commissioner. OFFICE OF THE DATA PROT. COMM’R, FACEBOOK IRELAND 
LTD.: REPORT OF AUDIT 5–20 (2011), available at http://dataprotection.ie/documents/face 
book%20report/final%20report/report.pdf.  
 36 Seda Gürses, Carmela Troncoso & Claudia Diaz, Engineering Privacy by Design 17–
19 (presented at the Fourth International Conference on Computers, Privacy, and Data 
Protection, Jan. 25–27, 2011), available at https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/ 
article-1542.pdf.  
 37 See, e.g., Omer Tene, PETs, Law and Surveillance, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 8, 
2012, 2:36 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/10/pets-law-and-surveil 
lance.html. 
 38 See, e.g., Yahoo CEO Fears Defying NSA Could Mean Prison, FOX NEWS (Sept. 12, 
2013), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2013/09/12/yahoo-ceo-fears-defying-nsa-could-mean-
prison.  
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untrustworthy.39 Much maligned by privacy scholars40 and increasingly 
challenged by a reality where third parties store massive troves of digital 
information about individuals, the third-party doctrine is in fact based on an 
assumption similar to that underlying PETs, namely that third parties are not to 
be trusted. In the words of the Supreme Court, “It is well settled that when an 
individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his 
confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information.”41 
According to the Supreme Court, any legitimate expectation of privacy is 
eviscerated when an individual confides his or her information to a third party, 
based on an “assumption of risk” rationale.42 
Hence, PETs are aligned with the assumptions and objectives of the 
constitutional framework,43 which given its level of abstraction is not tech-
oriented, while not always in tune with the assumptions and goals of the tech-
oriented information privacy framework.44 In other words, PETs are trapped in 
a regulatory limbo between a framework that recognizes their goals but not their 
means, and one that recognizes their means but not their goals. 
This is not to say that information privacy law is misguided or irrelevant. It 
deals with important privacy issues that arise in numerous circumstances where 
an individual is obliged to share information with a trusted party, such as a 
family physician or a bank. In such situations, preventing information flow is 
not an option: a patient would not want to be treated by a physician who has no 
                                                                                                                       
 39 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563–64 
(2009). 
 40 Trying to document criticism of the third-party doctrine in a footnote, Orin Kerr 
notes: “A list of every article or book that has criticized the doctrine would make this the 
world’s longest law review footnote.” Id. at 563 n.5. The thrust of the criticism is that 
technology dictates that individuals’ digital identities are curated by third parties including 
financial institutions, healthcare providers, education institutions, online providers, retailers, 
government agencies, etc. See also A. Michael Froomkin, “PETs Must Be on a Leash”: 
How U.S. Law (and Industry Practice) Often Undermines and Even Forbids Valuable 
Privacy Enhancing Technology, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 971–73 (2013). 
 41 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984); see also Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 42 Cf. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“But, even assuming, as I do 
not, that individuals ‘typically know’ that a phone company monitors calls for internal 
reasons, it does not follow that they expect this information to be made available to the 
public in general or the government in particular.” (citation omitted)). 
 43 Including, in the United States, the third-party doctrine. See Kerr, supra note 39, at 
563–64. 
 44 Joris van Hoboken points out that PETs pursue a more absolutist agenda than even 
constitutional privacy: providing individuals with unfettered liberty from surveillance. 
Constitutional privacy frameworks recognize the legitimate interest of the state to carry on 
surveillance in certain contexts, as long as such activity is proportional and regulated by law. 
Hence, constitutional privacy can be depicted as a constant balancing act, while PETs—
perhaps appropriately as a “weapon of the weak”—stack the deck against any form of 
surveillance. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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information about her symptoms and medical history, nor would a bank be 
willing to offer credit to a counterparty it does not know. 
Similarly, PETs do not aspire to address the full gamut of privacy problems. 
They do not deal with the subtle privacy issues that arise in social contexts, such 
as those derived from information sharing within a family or group of friends;45 
with privacy concerns arising after disclosure of information to trusted parties, 
such as a family physician; or with issues relating to identity construction and 
self-presentation.46 At the same time, PETs do address an important facet of 
privacy and therefore merit a policy response. Given the thrust of the 
constitutional privacy framework and the genesis of information privacy law in 
fears about surveillance, which have become salient over the past few months, 
policymakers should recognize and expand by appropriate regulatory measures 
the role of technologies that enable individuals to enforce their right to privacy 
as freedom from surveillance. At the very least, PETs should not be prohibited 
or undermined; in certain cases, they should be mandated by law. 
The current framework’s treatment of PETs is not the result of regulatory 
oversight. It is precisely the capacity of PETs to limit surveillance that has 
caused them to clash with powerful state interests, particularly in law 
enforcement and national security.47 
Recent disclosures depict the NSA as being responsible for introducing 
backdoors and security weaknesses in electronic components, standards, back-
end systems, and communications, for the purpose of collecting surveillance 
information on a massive scale—all in the name of national security.48 Experts 
in the computer security research community have long warned that weakening 
the infrastructure of information and communications technology through 
backdoors and security vulnerabilities is in fact detrimental to national security. 
The damage done by making systems susceptible to surveillance and attack—by 
multiple, potentially unintended, actors—far outweighs the advantages gained 
by exploiting such vulnerabilities to collect intelligence.49 Furthermore, such 
                                                                                                                       
 45 See Kashmir Hill, Oops. Mark Zuckerberg’s Sister Has a Private Facebook Photo 
Go Public, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2012, 8:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/ 
2012/12/26/oops-mark-zuckerbergs-sister-has-a-private-facebook-photo-go-public.  
 46 Seda Gürses & Claudia Diaz, Two Tales of Privacy in Online Social Networks, 11 
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 29, 33 (2013). 
 47 See, e.g., Lisa Vaas, FBI Claims that Tor Stymied Child Abuse Investigation, NAKED 
SECURITY (June 14, 2012), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/06/14/fbi-tor-child-abuse-
investigation. 
 48 James Ball, Julian Borger & Glenn Greenwald, Revealed: How US and UK Spy 
Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security.  
 49 Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau have written extensively about this issue. They 
argue that national security depends on the security of commercial and other non-military 
systems and data. See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE 
POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 79 (1998). They also warn that “communication 
is fundamental to our species; private communication is fundamental to both our national 
security and our democracy.” Whitfield Diffie & Susan Landau, Internet Eavesdropping: A 
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backdoors and security weaknesses negatively affect some of the guarantees 
offered by PETs, to the detriment not only of individual PET users, but also of 
law enforcement and national security personnel.50 
Private sector entities, too, have been lukewarm about the deployment of 
PETs. Businesses that thrive on the collection and use of personal information 
have little incentive to deploy technological tools that limit information flows.51 
However, the information privacy framework must guarantee that the 
principles underlying constitutional privacy are not discarded with ease. 
Moreover, information privacy law could refocus on data minimization, or at 
least not discount this principle entirely. The existing focus on data use, as 
opposed to data collection, assumes that data controllers are benevolent and 
always in control. In reality, misuses of personal information and unanticipated 
access by third parties through data breaches or government access abound, and 
prove these assumptions wrong. 
III. SURVEILLANCE DEFINED 
Today, surveillance capabilities are no longer restricted to the realm of 
states. As more and more daily activities are mediated by technology, private 
sector organizations have gained the ability to conduct surveillance at an 
unprecedented scale, meticulously documenting individuals’ communications, 
online and offline purchases, financial activities, travel, energy consumption, 
geo-location, and health.52 As one commentator notes: “Coupled with the 
                                                                                                                       
Brave New World of Wiretapping, SCI. AM. (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.scientific 
american.com/article.cfm?id=internet-eavesdropping. More recently, as a reaction to the 
revelations on NSA and GCHQ surveillance, a group of UK security researchers argued in 
an Open Letter, 
By weakening cryptographic standards, in as yet undisclosed ways, and by inserting 
weaknesses into products which we all rely on to secure critical infrastructure, we 
believe that the agencies have been acting against the interests of the public that they 
are meant to serve. We find it shocking that agencies of both the US and UK 
governments now stand accused of undermining the systems which protect us. By 
weakening all our security so that they can listen in to the communications of our 
enemies, they also weaken our security against our potential enemies. 
Nigel Smart et al., Open Letter from UK Security Researchers, BRISTOL CRYPTOGRAPHY 
BLOG (Sept. 16, 2013, 1:40 PM), http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/open-letter-
from-uk-security-researchers.html.  
 50 See CALEA 2 and Tor, Law Enforcement, TOR (May 9, 2013), https://blog.tor 
project.org/category/tags/law-enforcement. 
 51 See LONDON ECON., STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PRIVACY-ENHANCING 
TECHNOLOGIES (PETS) 30–31 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/priva 
cy/docs/studies/final_report_pets_16_07_10_en.pdf. 
 52 Roger Clarke has called this “dataveillance.” Roger Clarke, Introduction to 
Dataveillance and Information Privacy, DATAVEILLANCE & PRIVACY, http://www.anu.edu. 
au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Intro.html#DV (last updated Aug. 7, 2006); see also Tal Z. 
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private sector’s attractiveness as a convenient repository of information is its 
legal allure, notably in instances when private data gathering is subject to less 
stringent regulation than what the government faces.”53 
Companies like Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon have 
become vertically integrated up and down the digital value chain, offering 
devices, operating systems, app stores, browsers, geo-location services, social 
networks, ad targeting, tailored content, and many more data intensive products 
and services.54 Indeed, Apple has cemented its position as a market icon by 
offering a seamlessly cohesive user experience based on well-designed, fully 
integrated software and devices. As users have shifted from desktop to mobile 
platforms, Google has begun to provide a mobile experience featuring an 
operating system, search engine, map service, and app store. Even Microsoft, 
which has long adhered to a strategy of selling software for computers of every 
make, has launched its own tablet and refocused its business model to package 
“devices and services.”55 
This means that private sector entities are increasingly privy to an ever-
growing compilation of individuals’ personal information and devices. 
Moreover, with the shift to an ecosystem of cloud computing, individuals store, 
process, and retrieve their entire data portfolio through infrastructure (e.g., 
Dropbox), platform (e.g., Google Apps), and software (e.g., Evernote) service 
providers online. Governments can remotely access these massive troves of 
personal information or interfere in communications with—or sometimes 
without—legal process.56 
Consequently, government institutions increasingly assert surveillance 
powers in concert with private sector entities, constituting what some authors 
call a “surveillant assemblage.”57 This “invisible handshake,”58 which has 
recently come to (partial) light as a result of the NSA leaks, risks wholesale 
                                                                                                                       
Zarsky & Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity Intermediaries: 
The “Soft eID” Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335 (2013).  
 53 Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private–Public Intelligence Partnerships 
in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 908 (2008).  
 54 Not all of the companies offer all of the specified services but the trend is toward 
greater integration. See Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, It’s Not How Much Data You Have, 
but How You Use It: Assessing Privacy in the Context of Consumer Data Integration 1 
(presented to FTC Workshop: The Big Picture: Comprehensive Online Data Collection, Dec. 
6, 2012), available at http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF-White-Paper-
Its-Not-How-Much-Data-You-Have-But-How-You-Use-It_FINAL1.pdf.  
 55 Letter from Steven A. Ballmer, Chief Exec. Officer, Microsoft, To Our Shareholders, 
Customers, Partners, and Employees  1–2 (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://www.micro 
soft.com/investor/reports/ar12/shareholder-letter/index.html.  
 56 See generally 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. No. 4 (Nov. 2012), http://idpl.oxfordjour 
nals.org/content/2/4.toc (special issue surveying systematic government access to private-
sector data in nine countries). 
 57 Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 12, at 608.  
 58 Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The 
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 14–16 (2003).  
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circumvention of constitutional and legislative privacy safeguards. It may result 
in a highly efficient and largely unaccountable surveillance infrastructure 
posing an ominous threat to democratic institutions. 
For governments, the surveillant assemblage has numerous advantages. 
First, it is highly efficient to use existing organizations, capabilities, and 
technologies for surveillance—through outsourcing,59 legal obligations, 
voluntary cooperation, coercion,60 or infiltration61—instead of establishing 
them anew. In addition, individuals do not interface with the government in the 
same ways or with the same frequency as they do with the private sector, 
creating ample opportunity for information collection. Today, surveillance has 
become so cheap and ingrained into technology architecture that businesses 
often need to invest in order not to subject their users to surveillance.62 Large-
scale technological infrastructures are particularly prone to large-scale 
surveillance risks.63 
Second, the state can—and actually does64—co-opt “Big Brother’s Little 
Helpers”65 into its surveillance efforts through a combination of carrots and 
sticks. The carrots for companies include a sense of patriotism or good 
citizenship; relationships with government decision-makers and regulators; 
international protection and promotion; and assistance in bids for government 
                                                                                                                       
 59 NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden himself worked for Booz Allen Hamilton, a 
large government contractor in this space. According to the New York Times, “Edward J. 
Snowden’s employer, Booz Allen Hamilton, has become one of the largest and most 
profitable corporations in the United States almost exclusively by serving a single client: the 
government of the United States.” Binyamin Appelbaum & Eric Lipton, Leaker’s Employer 
Is Paid To Maintain Government Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/booz-allen-grew-rich-on-government-contracts.html. John M. 
McConnell, who was Director of National Intelligence under the Bush Administration, is a 
senior executive at Booz. James R. Clapper Jr., who fills the same role for the Obama 
Administration, is a former Booz executive. Id.  
 60 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 39, at 590–91; John J. Biggs, Lavabit Founder Details 
Government Surveillance of Secure Email While Documents Disclose Epic Trolling of Feds, 
TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 3, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/10/03/lavabit-founder-details-gov 
ernment-surveillance-of-secure-email-while-documents-disclose-epic-trolling-of-feds.  
 61 See Ryan Gallagher, How the NSA Is Trying To Sabotage a U.S. Government-
Funded Countersurveillance Tool, SLATE (Oct. 4, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/future_tense/2013/10/04/tor_foxacid_flying_pig_nsa_attempts_to_sabotage_countersu
rveillance_tool.html. 
 62 See LRDP KANTOR LTD. & CTR. FOR PUB. REFORM, COMPARATIVE STUDY ON 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NEW PRIVACY CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR IN THE LIGHT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 12–14 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_en.pdf.  
 63 See Olga Khazan, The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping, 
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/ 
07/the-creepy-long-standing-practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855.  
 64 See Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 6; Greenwald et al., supra note 14. 
 65 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 636–37 (2004). 
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contracts. The sticks may include legal action or regulatory scrutiny, and 
warning of dire national or business consequences in case of refusal. A recent 
survey conducted on systematic government access to private sector data in nine 
jurisdictions found that “the most frequent way that governments obtain 
systematic access to private-sector information is by asking for it, what one 
workshop participant labeled ‘systematic volunteerism.’”66 In short, corporate 
officers are unlikely to resist when approached by secret intelligence agencies 
with compelling letterheads. Moreover, enrollment in the government’s 
intelligence operation can prove to be a lucrative business opportunity in its 
own right. In fact, the U.S. government may be the biggest customer of 
corporate data aggregators such as Acxiom and LexisNexis.67 According to an 
ACLU report: “The government is not just dipping into a preexisting 
commercial marketplace to purchase data; companies are actually creating and 
reshaping their products to meet the needs of government security agencies.”68 
Third, private sector entities are not subject to the constitutional privacy 
protections that constrain the state. By keeping the surveillance apparatus at 
arm’s length, governments can have their cake and eat it too: conducting 
surveillance with little safeguards or judicial and legislative scrutiny. As noted 
by the ACLU: “[Private sector enrollment] offers what is often a path of least 
resistance to working around privacy laws.”69 Consider a recent case where a 
federal court entered an order requiring Twitter to turn over to the government 
subscribers’ non-content information, including names, addresses, dates, times, 
and IP addresses of Twitter activity. The court rejected the subscribers’ Fourth 
Amendment challenge, stating: “If Twitter decided to record or retain this 
information, any privacy concerns were the consequence of private action, not 
government action. The mere recording of IP address information by Twitter 
and subsequent access by the government cannot by itself violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”70 
Fourth, in the past, a clear legal barrier separated the collection of data for 
domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering. In contrast, recent 
disclosures indicate that the FBI and the NSA have been working closely 
                                                                                                                       
 66 Fred H. Cate, James X. Dempsey & Ira S. Rubinstein, Systematic Government 
Access to Private-Sector Data, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L.J. 195, 198–99 (2012), available at 
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/195.full.pdf+html.  
 67 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-674, PERSONAL INFORMATION: KEY 
FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS DO NOT REQUIRE INFORMATION RESELLERS TO SAFEGUARD ALL 
SENSITIVE DATA 7 (2006). 
 68 ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 26 (2004) (citation omitted), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf.  
 69 Id. at 2. 
 70 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. 
Supp. 2d 114, 132–33 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
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together to assemble a giant communications database.71 This phenomenon is 
not unique to the United States.72 In the United Kingdom, for example, the 
Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008 explicitly provides: “Information obtained by 
any of the intelligence services in connection with the exercise of any of its 
functions may be used by that service in connection with the exercise of any of 
its other functions.”73 Hence, “function creep” has allowed information 
collected by the private sector to find its way to national security authorities, 
which then repurpose the data for law enforcement or intelligence use. 
Fifth, there is an international side to privatized surveillance, with large 
service providers (typically based in the United States) increasingly storing data 
about a global user base and being approached by multiple national law 
enforcement agencies.74 This is evident particularly in the context of cloud 
computing, with the blurring of jurisdictional lines between states, service 
providers, and individuals.75 Another aspect is the exchange of personal 
information not only between private and public sector entities but also among 
intelligence agencies around the globe. Finally, even those (few) legal 
safeguards that exist with respect to the monitoring of a state’s citizens do not 
apply to non-nationals, thereby subjecting them to practically unfettered 
surveillance.76 
                                                                                                                       
 71 Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 
6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of-
nsa.html.  
 72 See IAN BROWN & DOUWE KORFF, FOUND. FOR INFO. PRIVACY RESEARCH (FIPR), 
UK INFORMATION COMMISSIONER STUDY PROJECT: PRIVACY & LAW ENFORCEMENT 30–33 
(2004), available at http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/3880/1/3880.pdf.  
 73 Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008, § 19, 12(5) HALS. STAT. (4th ed.) 613, 635–36 
(Eng.); see also Ian Brown, Government Access to Private-Sector Data in the United 
Kingdom, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L.J. 230, 233 (2012). 
 74 See, e.g., Peter Swire, From Real-Time Intercepts to Stored Records: Why 
Encryption Drives the Government To Seek Access to the Cloud, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L.J. 
200, 205–06 (2012); Tanguy Van Overstraeten & Ronan Tigner, Yahoo! Saga Continues: 
Yahoo! Must Not Hand Over Personal Data to the Public Prosecutor, LINKLATERS (Jan. 30, 
2012), http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication1403Newsletter/TMT-Newsletter-
January-2012/Pages/9_Belgium-Yahoo!-saga-continues-Yahoo-personal-data-public-prose 
cutor.aspx. 
 75 Joris van Hoboken, Axel Arnbak & Nico van Eijk, Obscured by Clouds or How To 
Address Governmental Access to Cloud Data from Abroad 17–18 (presented at Privacy Law 
Scholars Conference, June 6–7, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2276103.  
 76 While the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has applied ECHR protections 
to foreign nationals outside of Europe, it has done so strictly in the specific context of a 
territory subject to belligerent occupation by an EU Member State. This situation is not 
parallel to the application of U.S. constitutional protection, for example, to EU residents in 
the EU, given that the EU is not subject to U.S. military occupation. Similarly, it is doubtful 
that European Courts would apply ECHR protections to, say, residents of Yemen, who may 
be subject to surveillance by EU national security agencies. See Al-Jedda v. United 
Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092; Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1093. 
See also Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Statement on Activities 
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The surveillant assemblage heightens the importance of the untrusted 
controller paradigm. To paraphrase the Miranda warning, “information 
collected may and will be used against you.” Companies are not shy about 
disclosing this risk in their privacy statements.77 Policymakers should respond 
to the architecture of surveillance with a mix of appropriate legal and 
technological tools. The law should not always assume that data controllers are 
trustworthy and it should promote—or at the very least not hamper—the 
deployment of PETs. 
IV. PETS DEFINED 
“PETs” has become a common reference term in policy circles, referring to 
a variety of technology-driven privacy solutions. However, not all solutions 
adhere to the same definition of privacy, nor do they translate privacy problems 
into a uniform solution space. This should come as no surprise, given that the 
term “privacy” itself is notoriously hard to define.78 Accordingly, researchers 
                                                                                                                       
Authorized Under Section 702 of FISA (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/ 
index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/869-dni-statement-on-activi 
ties-authorized-under-section-702-of-fisa (“Section 702 is a provision of FISA that is 
designed to facilitate the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning non-U.S. 
persons located outside of the United States. It cannot be used to intentionally target any 
U.S. citizen, any other U.S. person, or anyone located within the United States.”); see also 
Caspar Bowden, PRISM: The EU Must Take Steps To Protect Cloud Data from US 
Snoopers, INDEPENDENT (July 10, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/ 
prism-the-eu-must-take-steps-to-protect-cloud-data-from-us-snoopers-8701175.html.  
 77 For example, Facebook’s privacy policy states: “We may access, preserve and share 
your information in response to a legal request (like a search warrant, court order or 
subpoena) if we have a good faith belief that the law requires us to do so.” Facebook Data 
Use Policy: Some Other Things You Need To Know, FACEBOOK, https://www.face 
book.com/about/privacy/other (last updated Dec. 11, 2012). Google’s privacy policy states: 
“We will share personal information . . . if we have a good-faith belief that access, use, 
preservation or disclosure of the information is reasonably necessary to: meet any applicable 
law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request.” Google Privacy Policy, 
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy (last updated June 24, 2013). 
LinkedIn states: “We will not disclose personal information . . . unless LinkedIn has a good 
faith belief that disclosure is permitted by law or is reasonably necessary to: (1) comply with 
a legal requirement or process, including, but not limited to, civil and criminal subpoenas, 
court orders or other compulsory disclosures.” LinkedIn Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN, 
http://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy (last updated May 13, 2013). These non-
disclosure exceptions are broad, not limited to compliance with a court order or subpoena 
but rather any “legal request” (Facebook), “enforceable governmental request” (Google) or 
“other compulsory disclosures” (LinkedIn). 
 78 For notable attempts to define privacy see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, 
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214–19 (1890); see also HELEN NISSENBAUM, 
PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 103–26 
(2010); WESTIN, supra note 25, at 24–26; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 
YALE L.J. 421, 428–40 (1980); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386–89 
(1960);  Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479–90 (2006).  
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from various sub-disciplines within the computer science community have 
proposed a broad range of technologies to address different aspects of privacy 
in digital systems. 
In defining PETs, this Article focuses on technologies that address the 
privacy issues raised by mass collection of data and its possible repurposing for 
conducting surveillance or subjecting individuals to intrusive practices, such as 
censorship. This restricts the scope of PETs to technologies designed to provide 
privacy protection from untrusted and potentially adversarial data controllers. 
The presumption that privacy guarantees must not depend on the goodwill of a 
powerful centralized entity follows a tradition of research in cryptography and 
security engineering, which defines a “trusted system or component” as “one 
which can break the security policy” (a definition that ironically originates with 
the NSA).79 More specifically, this Article restricts PETs to technological 
solutions that combine three principles: elimination of the single point of failure 
inherent with any centralized trusted party; data minimization; and subjecting 
protocols and software to community driven public scrutiny. The justification 
and relative importance of each of these three objectives varies depending on 
the relevant application. 
PETs minimize data disclosure, for example through use of advanced 
cryptographic protocols, so that, ideally, only information that users explicitly 
share is made available to intended recipients. This guarantees minimization of 
data collected and consequently mitigates risk of data misuse for surveillance 
purposes. 
In some cases, collaborative action is needed. For example, for a user to be 
able to communicate anonymously, other users must provide cover for her by 
forming an anonymity set.80 Collaborative PETs require that trust be distributed 
among multiple entities to avoid a single point of failure. In other words, 
privacy guarantees must hold even if a subset of peers are malicious and collude 
with each other to collect information about the user. 
Finally, the elimination of the single point of failure inherent to the “trusted 
service provider” model also requires the delegation of trust to other system 
components, including protocols, software implementations, and end user 
                                                                                                                       
 79 Ross Anderson, “Trusted Computing” Frequently Asked Questions, UNIV. OF 
CAMBRIDGE COMPUTER LAB. (Aug. 2003), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html. 
Ross Anderson argues: 
The fundamental issue is that whoever controls the [Trusted Computing] infrastructure 
will acquire a huge amount of power. Having this single point of control is like making 
everyone use the same bank, or the same accountant, or the same lawyer. There are 
many ways in which this power could be abused. 
Id.; see also Dieter Gollmann, Why Trust Is Bad for Security, 157 ELECTRONIC NOTES IN 
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 80 “Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the 
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devices. In order to prevent PETs from simply transforming the “trust the 
service provider” model into a “trust the protocol” (i.e., the engineers) model, it 
is necessary to enable experts and the public at large to verify that trust 
assumptions are not misplaced. This means that protocol design and software 
implementations need to be publicly available and open to scrutiny not only by 
development teams but also by outsiders. This requirement is well aligned with 
the security engineering community’s culture of continuously exploring attacks 
on theoretical protocol designs and deployed systems, and publishing the 
results, as well as with the open source and free software culture that many 
PETs developers subscribe to. 
The importance of these three principles has become even more apparent in 
light of the recent NSA revelations. Programs like PRISM highlight the 
importance of avoiding centralized single points of failure with access to 
massive amounts of data. The leaked NSA presentation entitled “Tor Stinks” 
states that the NSA and GCHQ are operating some nodes in the open Tor 
network precisely for the purpose of collecting surveillance information and 
undermining the privacy protections afforded by the system.81 Their limited 
success is due to the fact that their nodes constitute only a small fraction of 
existing Tor relays.82 Finally, many of the vulnerabilities in existing open 
source privacy technologies that are exploited by the NSA according to recently 
leaked documents had already been independently discovered by the academic 
research community.83 In some cases, this has led to certain systems and 
algorithms not being recommended, and in others, to security updates that 
successfully eliminated the vulnerabilities. 
A tight definition of PETs, which relies on these three principles, leaves out 
of scope various technologies that are designed to mitigate privacy concerns not 
directly related to surveillance. This includes, for example, privacy-preserving 
data publishing84 and differential privacy85 that can be applied to enable the 
sharing and analysis of datasets of personal records while protecting the identity 
of individuals whose data is included in the dataset. These technologies do not 
fit this Article’s definition of PETs, since they rely on a model in which a 
trusted centralized entity is charged with protecting users’ personal information, 
thereby constituting a single point of failure.86 This trusted entity, the owner of 
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http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-
document.  
 82 See id. 
 83 See id. 
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the database, called the “curator” in the case of differential privacy, by 
definition has access to all of the information in the database and is in a position 
to repurpose it for surveillance or categorizations that intrude upon individual or 
group rights.87 
Similarly, technologies that aim to restrict use of information that has been 
collected by a data controller, such as purpose-based access control models, rely 
on the data controller to define “reasonable” restrictions on its uses of data and 
to effectively enforce them through technological means.88 While such 
technologies can help an organization prevent its employees from accessing 
personal information for unauthorized purposes, they do not offer protection 
from the organization itself, which constitutes a single point of failure with 
respect to surveillance concerns. 
Other technologies, such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P),89 
aim to provide users with means to communicate their preferences to 
organizations and make such organizations’ privacy practices more transparent. 
In addition, in line with the third PETs objective stated above, P3P is a public 
standard that is open to public scrutiny. Yet, P3P does not provide mechanisms 
to ensure that user preferences are respected or to guarantee that the actual 
practices of organizations comply with those expressed in their P3P policies.90 
Thus, P3P fails to minimize default data disclosure towards a centralized entity 
that is in a position to conduct surveillance. The same is true for privacy settings 
and other signaling mechanisms, such as DNT.91 
Finally, this Article’s definition of PETs leaves out technologies that 
address privacy-relevant decision-making or concerns related to intrusive 
practices. Technologies that focus on helping users make better privacy choices 
are complementary to the PETs discussed in this Article, as they assist users in 
deciding when and how to voluntarily share data with others.92 However, until 
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now, the privacy problem addressed by these technologies is mainly related to 
social privacy concerns rather than to surveillance. The options a user has in 
making a decision vary between not disclosing certain information or using 
privacy controls to limit its dissemination, as opposed to solutions that leverage 
PETs to limit service providers’ access to the data.93 Further, technologies that 
protect users from intrusive practices, like ad blockers, do not necessarily limit 
the data that is disclosed to service providers and thus do not diminish their 
surveillance capabilities either.94 
In defining PETs, this Article takes into consideration not only the nature of 
the technology but also its application context; namely, the roles—and power 
relations—of the stakeholders involved. For example, this Article considers 
encryption algorithms that allow users to protect their personal information as 
PETs. When those same algorithms are used by organizations to protect their 
own (e.g., military, corporate) secrets, then they are out of the scope of the PET 
definition. In another example, Private Set Intersection protocols, which help 
people find common friends without revealing to each other their entire list of 
friends are considered PETs. Yet, when used to compare and find matches 
between passengers and no-fly lists, similar protocols are not considered PETs, 
since in this context their goal is not to ensure freedom from surveillance, but 
rather, to maintain the confidentiality of a dataset kept by a controller towards 
another organization.95 
Various authors have used the term PETs differently. Rubinstein, for 
example, distinguishes between “substitute PETs” (which block or minimize 
data collection); “complementary privacy-friendly PETs” (which enhance 
notice and choice in a privacy-friendly manner); and “complementary privacy-
preserving PETs” (which enable ad targeting without allowing an ad network to 
track consumers).96 This Article limits the definition of PETs to Rubinstein’s 
first, and for the most part, third categories, including anonymous 
communication tools as well as solutions to provide provable guarantees of 
privacy through cryptographic protocols. Rubinstein’s second category, 
comprising “privacy-friendly PETs,” such as advertising icons and cookie 
managers, are out of scope of this Article’s definition for PETs, as they rely on 
a centralized trusted controller. 
In her earlier work on “privacy research paradigms,” Gürses defines PETs 
as solutions that stem from security engineering communities aiming to 
“minimize collection of data during communications”—which mostly coincides 
with this Article’s definition of PETs—as well as solutions that allow users to 
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“control data post-data collection” (which are not considered PETs in this 
Article). Her definition of PETs focuses on the commonalities of solutions that 
target confidentiality, data minimization or anonymity, while making 
abstraction of the differences in trust assumptions inherent to different 
solutions, especially towards data controllers, which constitutes the main 
criteria for a classification of PETs in this Article. 
V. PETS CLASSIFIED 
To provide protection from surveillance and interference, PETs rely on 
different models for the distribution of responsibilities among individuals, data 
controllers, and third parties, depending on the relevant trust model. Given the 
focus of the legal framework on data controller responsibilities, this Article first 
proposes a categorization of PETs based on the role of the data controller. Next, 
it addresses the attendant policy implications. 
A. Category I: PETs Implemented by Data Controller 
The first category comprises PETs based on advanced cryptographic 
protocols that must be run jointly by a user and a data controller, and thus 
require controllers to actively integrate them into service design and 
implementation. In other words, users cannot deploy these PETs unilaterally; 
their deployment is contingent on active participation by the data controller. 
The goal of these PETs is to enable the provision of a service that takes as input 
private user information without the controller becoming privy to such 
information. Some examples follow. 
1. Privacy-Preserving Pay-as-You-Drive Tolling 
In October 2009, the European Commission announced that a European 
Electronic Toll Service (EETS) would substitute the flat road tax systems that 
existed for decades in EU Member States.97 Electronic Toll Pricing (ETP) 
calculates the road taxes to be paid by drivers based on parameters such as the 
distance they drove, the type of roads used, and the time of usage.98 The 
expected benefits of migrating towards a pay-as-you-drive system include the 
ability to apply congestion charges, lower costs for occasional drivers, and 
incentivizing environmentally friendly driving practices.99 At the same time, 
most of the proposed ETP architectures rely on massive collection of drivers’ 
location data by the Toll Service Provider (TSP) to periodically compute 
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fees.100 The collection of this information would enable the TSP to infer 
sensitive private information with respect to individual drivers.101 Hence, in this 
configuration, ETP systems unwittingly become infrastructures of mass 
surveillance. 
To enable the benefits of variable toll pricing while minimizing privacy 
costs, a group of scientists at KU Leuven devised PrETP, a system based on 
advanced cryptographic protocols that ensures that drivers pay road taxes 
according to their usage without revealing to the TSP the location information 
that was used to calculate the fee.102 With PrETP, location data is stored locally 
on a user device that computes the fee to be paid at the end of each billing 
period.103 The TSP receives only “commitments” that are computed based on 
drivers’ location data.104 Cryptographic commitments have two important 
properties: “hiding” and “binding.”105 The hiding property ensures that the 
location points traversed by a driver are encrypted so that the TSP cannot read 
their values.106 The binding property guarantees that users cannot modify the 
location values they have committed to after their submission to the TSP.107 In 
order to ensure that all locations have been used in the computation of a fee, 
PrETP relies on random spot-checks.108 This involves requiring a user to prove 
(by “opening” its corresponding commitment) that she has included (and 
correctly paid for) locations at which she has been spotted, e.g., by a road 
camera or radar.109 The practical feasibility of PrETP was demonstrated with a 
prototype implementation that runs on a low-cost standard embedded device.110 
The PrETP architecture minimizes the information disclosed to a TSP by 
default to only subscriber registration and payment data.111 Although fees are 
computed based on users’ location traces, such traces are available only to users 
themselves on their personal device—and not revealed to the TSP.112 This 
design considerably lowers the level of trust that users must place in the TSP 
with respect to their private information. Even if such a controller is malicious 
or subject to data breaches or government requests, it cannot access or reveal 
the location trail of its users. Thus, with respect to user privacy, the TSP does 
not constitute a single point of failure. 
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The reliance on random spot-checks for fraud detection implies that some 
location points are occasionally disclosed to the TSP. However, such disclosure 
requires active engagement by the user, who is asked to open a commitment to 
prove that a fee computation for a specific location point at which she had been 
spotted has been recorded.113 The need for user collaboration serves as a check 
on the data controller’s power. If the TSP requests that a user open a 
disproportionate number of commitments, the user can spot such a practice and 
challenge it as an illegitimate attempt to compile a detailed location trace. The 
specification of the PrETP protocols and associated security proofs are available 
in a published academic article, and thus open to public scrutiny. This also 
means that it is possible to discuss further legal or social aspects of the proposed 
solution, e.g., for evaluating its implications for the burden of proof. Deploying 
a privacy-preserving electronic toll system based on such protocols also 
requires that the software implementation is made available for review, to 
ensure that it follows the protocol specifications and is implemented securely. 
Further, the privacy guarantees of the system require end user devices to be 
secure, since unauthorized access by an adversary to the data on the device 
would compromise the confidentiality of the recorded location trail. Hence, the 
privacy guarantees in this system are also contingent on public scrutiny of the 
security of end user devices. 
2. Privacy-Preserving Smart Metering 
Protocols similar to those employed in privacy preserving electronic toll 
pricing have been devised to implement privacy-preserving smart metering. 
Smart metering allows utilities to charge variable energy prices based on 
accurate readings and flexible pricing schemes; for example, charging higher 
prices during peak consumption periods.114 Other advantages of a smart grid 
infrastructure include better forecasting of energy needs; more accurate 
settlement of costs between energy suppliers and producers; as well as 
customized energy efficiency advice.115 Most smart grid projects rely on an 
architecture requiring the delivery of fine-grained household measurements to 
utilities.116 These architectures suffer from severe security and privacy 
                                                                                                                       
 113 Id. at 65. 
 114 INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’R OF ONT. & FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, SMARTPRIVACY 
FOR THE SMART GRID: EMBEDDING PRIVACY INTO THE DESIGN OF ELECTRICITY 
CONSERVATION 8–9 (2009), available at www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/pbd-smartpriv-
smartgrid.pdf. 
 115 Id. at 4–6. 
 116 Ross Anderson & Shailendra Fuloria, On the Security Economics of Electricity 
Metering 1–2 (presented at the Ninth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security 
(WEIS 2010), June 7–8, 2010), available at http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/papers/session 
5/weis2010_anderson_r.pdf. 
2013] DATA CONTROLLER IN PRIVACY LAW 947 
 
problems.117 Consumer privacy concerns have already jeopardized the 
deployment of smart meters in the Netherlands, leading to a deadlock.118 
The seemingly irreconcilable tension between privacy and the functionality 
of smart meters can be resolved through the use of cryptographic protocols, 
such as those proposed by Rial and Danezis.119 Their proposed system 
guarantees to the utility provider that the fee paid by a user is correctly 
calculated based on the energy consumed, while ensuring that the only 
information revealed to the data controller is the final fee, as opposed to fine-
grained energy consumption data.120 Their design supports flexible, complex 
pricing policies, and has been proven feasible through efficient prototype 
implementations.121 
Further work in the area of privacy-preserving smart metering includes 
protocols by Kursawe and others to privately compute aggregate meter 
measurements, allowing for fraud and leakage detection, real-time prediction of 
demand, and further statistical processing of meter measurements—all without 
revealing information about individual meter readings.122 Cavoukian and 
Kursawe argue that these protocols are a good example of “Privacy by Design,” 
as they allow for the protection of privacy without compromising the quality of 
smart grid operations.123 While guaranteeing the accuracy of payments, the 
protocols minimize the data disclosed to a utility provider to include subscriber 
data; household fee due at the end of a billing period; and aggregate 
consumption per neighborhood.124 Customized energy advice solutions do not 
need to run at the data controller’s back-end; they can be installed locally on the 
meter, which is only accessible within a household and has unlimited access to 
highly granular user data.125 
The protocols do not reveal fine-grained energy consumption data that 
could be used to infer sensitive personal information related to customers’ 
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lifestyle and daily activities.126 Thus, with respect to privacy, the trust model is 
identical to that employed in the existing (non-smart) infrastructure. In other 
words, these protocols facilitate the modernization of the infrastructure without 
introducing new surveillance risks. 
Whereas PrETP relies on random spot-checks for fraud detection, the trust 
model underlying privacy-preserving smart meter protocols assumes that the 
meters themselves are tamper-resistant.127 This assumption, too, is similar to 
that used to detect energy fraud in existing non-smart infrastructures: physical 
inspection of a metering device to determine if it has been tampered with. 
Furthermore, by comparing aggregate energy consumption at the neighborhood 
level with payment data, utilities can get a good indication of whether energy 
fraud is taking place in a certain locality.128 
The reliance on tamper-resistant devices for service integrity is, however, 
not an option in PrETP. Even if user devices cannot be tampered with, the input 
location data can be easily spoofed, for example, by feeding fake GPS data to 
the device. Additionally, the end user devices can simply be turned off, 
resulting in unrecorded or unpaid for road usage. By comparison, turning off a 
smart energy meter would interrupt the energy supply to the household.129 
Similar to the PrETP, smart meter protocols are open to public scrutiny and 
the software running in deployed metering devices is available for review to 
ensure that fine-grained energy consumption data is not being leaked by the 
metering device. 
3. Other Applications 
Additional proposals for implementing PETs with active participation of a 
data controller include e-cash systems that provide privacy benefits of cash 
payments (strong anonymity) while preventing fraud, such as double spending 
of electronic coins;130 search protocols allowing a search provider to return 
results that include search terms while learning neither the search terms nor the 
results;131 and digital credential systems132 that allow anonymous yet 
                                                                                                                       
 126 See Rial & Danezis, supra note 119, at 49. 
 127 See id. at 51. 
 128 See Kursawe, Danezis & Kohlweiss, supra note 122, at 175, 184, 186. 
 129 See, e.g., Smart Meters, ENEMALTA, http://www.enemalta.com.mt/index.aspx?cat=5 
&art=21&art1=55#Question1.15. 
 130 Jan Camenisch, Susan Hohenberger & Anna Lysyanskaya, Compact E-Cash, in 
ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY—EUROCRYPT 2005: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH ANNUAL 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC 
TECHNIQUES 302, 302–03 (Ronald Cramer ed., 2005), available at http://link.springer. 
com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fb136415.pdf. 
 131 See Rafail Ostrovsky & William E. Skeith III, Private Searching on Streaming Data, 
20 J. CRYPTOLOGY 397, 398, 401–02 (2007).  
 132 Digital credentials are the digital equivalent of paper-based credentials such as 
passports, driver’s licenses, membership cards, or tickets that give access to a service. 
Credentials are issued by an authority to an individual to certify attributes, qualifications, 
2013] DATA CONTROLLER IN PRIVACY LAW 949 
 
authenticated and accountable transactions between users and data controllers, 
and can be used to build privacy-preserving identity management systems.133  
As a common design principle, these PETs are designed to minimize the 
information that users disclose to a data controller in order to obtain a service, 
while guaranteeing the integrity of the service itself (e.g., ensuring that the 
parties participating in the system cannot cheat).134 A crucial element is that the 
protocol specifications and their associated security proofs are publicly 
available for review by experts other than the systems’ designers. Moreover, as 
users usually store their personal data locally, their personal devices need to be 
secured to prevent unauthorized access to the data they store. A benefit of 
locally storing personal information is that with probable cause, legitimate law 
enforcement investigations can target individuals (and their devices), while 
large-scale surveillance and data mining become impractical. 
In some cases, multiple PETs need to be in place to ensure that the privacy 
guarantees hold. This is the case, for example, for PETs whose objective is to 
enable anonymity, such as anonymous credentials and payments, which require 
use of anonymous communication channels.135 If this were not the case, the 
anonymity protection provided at the application layer would be compromised 
by the exposure of identifiers (e.g., IP addresses) at the network layer.136 
Many of the PETs described in this Part have been demonstrated to work 
efficiently in standard devices. Alas, there has been little interest to adopt them 
on the part of data controllers. As discussed above, this is often the result of 
data controllers’ thirst for users’ information, which they are loath to forgo 
unless forced to do so by regulators or public pressure.137 Surely, the (lack of) 
availability of advanced cryptographic expertise, the complexity of the 
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protocols, and the engineering implementation costs can also play a role in the 
decision-making process. Yet, some of these costs may be curbed if the 
protocols and algorithms underlying these systems are made open for public 
use. 
B. Category II: Client-Side Software Deployed by a User While Using a 
Service Offered by a Data Controller 
The second category of PETs comprises client-side tools and technologies 
that are deployed unilaterally by users to enhance their privacy while using a 
service offered by a data controller. Contrary to the previous category, these 
PETs require neither active engagement on the part of the data controller nor 
modification of its service.138 Yet given its control of the surrounding 
environment, the data controller retains the power to disable or block the use of 
these PETs, and such actions may in fact be in its business interest. 
Examples of PETs in this category include encryption tools that maintain 
the confidentiality of user content that is hosted or shared through a service 
offered by a data controller. For example, GnuPG allows users to encrypt and 
sign their email communications so that an email provider cannot access the 
content of the emails it hosts, which are available strictly to their intended 
recipients.139 Mymail-Crypt is a Google Chrome browser extension that 
implements GnuPG for the popular webmail service Gmail.140 
Similar tools have been developed to protect user-generated content shared 
in social networks such as Facebook. For example, through Scramble!, a 
Firefox browser extension, users can define a list of friends who are authorized 
to read a specific piece of content.141 The tool encrypts a user’s posts so that 
only her selected friends can read them.142 Neither other users nor Facebook 
itself can access the content.143 Obviously, in both of these applications, the 
intended recipients of the information (friends, email recipients) are trusted with 
its content. 
Other tools, such as chat clients that integrate Off-the-Record (OTR) 
protocols, provide content confidentiality, perfect forward secrecy, and 
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2013] DATA CONTROLLER IN PRIVACY LAW 951 
 
repudiability for instant messaging applications.144 Perfect forward secrecy 
ensures that past messages, even those recorded by an adversary who has 
observed (encrypted) traffic, cannot be recovered retroactively even if 
communicating parties are coerced to reveal their cryptographic keys.145 
Repudiability, which is the opposite of the typical non-repudiation property 
offered by digital signatures, ensures that once a communication has ended, no 
one—not even the users involved in the chat conversation—can prove whether 
a user sent a particular message.146 This protocol thus provides off-the-record 
properties for instant messaging communications that are similar to those of 
verbal conversations. 
Open source implementations of OTR protocols are available in instant 
messaging clients, such as Adium,147 Cryptocat,148 Xabber,149 IM+,150 and 
many others, that provide secure chat applications for Android, iPhone, and 
other platforms. Interestingly, Gmail’s Google Chat “Off the Record” 
settings151 do not offer the privacy guarantees of a cryptographic OTR protocol. 
The term “Off the Record” is used by Google to mean that chat logs are not 
retrievable by end users.152 Importantly, Google’s policy on “Off The Record” 
chats does not state that Google itself does not record the logs on its back-end 
servers.153 
This illustrates the most important difference between content encryption 
PETs and the privacy settings commonly offered by commercial data 
controllers, which provide communication and content hosting services. Both 
sets of tools protect content in the face of unauthorized users; but PETs also 
provide protection from surveillance by the controller itself, who is no longer 
privy to content communicated by a user. Thus, as opposed to privacy settings, 
the use of these PETs minimizes data disclosed to the controller, avoids relying 
on it as a trusted third party, and consequently, avoids a single point of failure. 
At the same time, these PETs may interfere with business models based on 
profiling users and monetizing their interests and preferences, a common 
business model for major email and social network providers. 
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As an added benefit to users, and arguably to society at large, the 
concealment of content from the controller inevitably diminishes its ability to 
censor users’ communications and curtail free speech.154 While advancing 
privacy and free speech rights, the lack of control over content also inevitably 
means enhanced opportunity for malicious actors to engage in perverse activity, 
such as child pornography, hate speech, and other criminal activities. This 
means that the resistance that PETs offer towards surveillance and control also 
makes it difficult to detect criminal activity or mandate “correct” behavior 
through code, e.g., through censorship of undesirable materials. This means that 
tools other than technology-based surveillance and control must be relied upon 
in order to deal with such activities.155 
It is important to note that content encryption tools by themselves do not 
provide protection from traffic analysis by data controllers, such as email, social 
network, Internet, and platform providers, who are in a position to observe 
encrypted communications. Such controllers can see when, how frequently, and 
with whom users communicate, and are able to infer social communication 
graphs from such data.156 To protect against this type of information leakage—
and potential surveillance—content encryption tools must be used in 
combination with the collaborative PETs classified in the third category 
below,157 which provide communication anonymity and other properties of 
traffic analysis resistance. 
Collaborative PETs providing anonymous communications, such as Tor,158 
enable users to access websites and online services anonymously. In this section 
we consider these technologies in relation to the data controller offering the 
online service that users access anonymously via Tor, while making abstraction 
of whether the anonymizing service is implemented by a single user or by a 
community of collaborating users. From the perspective of the data controller, 
the anonymous communication system can be seen as a client-side tool, since 
individuals can use it unilaterally without requiring the controller to modify its 
service. 
When a user accesses a service through Tor, it is not possible for the service 
provider to determine the user’s identity, which is masked behind a series of 
proxies.159 Furthermore, it is not possible for websites to link different sessions 
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to a single user, effectively disabling any tracking capability.160 However, 
service providers such as websites can block connections that come from the 
Tor network.161 In fact, they may be incentivized to do so in order to maximize 
behavioral advertising revenues, with which Tor can interfere. 
An additional approach for PETs in this category uses obfuscation, that is, 
the automated generation—by client-side software tools—of “fake” signals that 
are indistinguishable from users’ actual online activities, providing users with a 
noisy “cover.”162 One example of an obfuscation tool is TrackMeNot,163 a 
browser plugin that aims to obstruct search engines from compiling accurate 
user profiles based on individuals’ search history.164 To achieve this, 
TrackMeNot generates automated “dummy” queries, which obfuscate the user 
profile and elude profiling algorithms.165 Although TrackMeNot and other 
search obfuscation tools have been found to be vulnerable to attacks that allow 
search engines to distinguish between user-generated and computer-generated 
queries,166 further advances in this area may result in tools that achieve robust 
protection from profiling based on obfuscation.167  
To sum, client-side PETs in this category are deployed unilaterally by a 
user while using a service offered by a data controller, but do not depend on 
active data controller implementation. They satisfy the model of an untrusted 
data controller, relying on data minimization and avoidance of a single point of 
failure. They depend on the security of the software implementation of the PET, 
and thus require that the code be available for public scrutiny.  
C. Category III: Collaborative Applications Without a Data Controller 
A third category of PETs refers to stand-alone systems that are typically 
operated by a set of users who work collaboratively to achieve privacy 
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protection. In these systems, participants concurrently act as both users and 
service providers. The objective of these PETs is to enable the collaborative 
provision of a service without a centralized party, which would ostensibly be in 
a position to conduct surveillance. 
Collaborative solutions are particularly important to achieve privacy 
protection from traffic analysis.168 Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting 
communications and examining patterns in traffic data in order to gain 
intelligence.169 It can be performed even when the intercepted messages remain 
encrypted.170 In their book on wiretapping, Diffie and Landau highlight the 
importance of traffic analysis with respect to surveillance, stating that “traffic 
analysis, not cryptanalysis, is the backbone of communications intelligence.”171 
This is because traffic data is exposed by default and easy to process. Moreover, 
the communication patterns extracted through traffic analysis are often more 
indicative of behavior than actual content, and can be used to select targets to 
subject to more intensive surveillance.  
Most of the PETs designed to resist traffic analysis aim to provide 
communication anonymity. The key idea is that the users of the system join in 
order to provide cover for each other and thereby constitute an “anonymity 
set.”172 Adversaries recording and analyzing traffic data in such systems cannot 
determine which of the users in the anonymity set is associated with a specific 
action or recover communication patterns between users (i.e., the 
communication graph). Examples of such technologies include Mixmaster, a 
system for anonymous email;173 I2P for anonymous chat, email, and other 
applications;174 and Freenet for anonymous publishing, content sharing and 
forums.175 Additional efforts in this vein include peer-to-peer social networking 
services, including MyZone176 and Safebook.177 
But by far the most successful example of a PET in this category is the Tor 
network, which is used daily by more than half a million users to anonymously 
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browse the web, circumvent censorship, and communicate with each other.178 
To achieve strong anonymity, Tor routes user connections through a series of 
Tor relays (three relays by default), with each relay operated by an individual or 
organization, including multiple universities and the Chaos Computer Club.179  
In contrast to the previous category, where Tor is discussed in relation to a 
data controller (external to the Tor system) offering an online service that is 
accessed anonymously by users, here the focus is on the operation of the 
anonymity network itself, where participants in the system may not only act as 
end-users but also as service providers. This perspective is not concerned with 
data controllers that offer a service external to the anonymity network, but 
rather with the entities that implement it in a collaborative fashion. In this 
context, Tor, as well as other anonymity systems such as I2P, may be used not 
only to anonymously access external services (as considered in the previous 
category), but also to enable the provision of privacy-enhanced services within 
the network itself. Examples of such services include Tor hidden servers that 
offer chat, email, file sharing, blogs, etc.  
As with other anonymous communication networks, a key aspect of Tor is 
that no single relay can observe both the source and destination of a 
communication. If an anonymous communication system were built using a 
single proxy, that proxy would effectively act as a trusted party constituting a 
single point of failure with respect to both surveillance and censorship.180 
Consequently, single-proxy anonymity systems, such as Anonymizer181 and 
HideMyAss,182 are not only outside the scope of this Article’s definition of 
PETs, but also viewed with distrust by technical experts.183 This distrust seems 
well founded, given reports that Anonymizer is linked to companies that sell 
surveillance systems to governments184 and that HideMyAss has revealed the 
identity of “anonymous” users to law enforcement.185 
Instead, the trust model in networks such as Tor is distributed among 
multiple network relays to avoid a single point of failure. From a protocol 
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perspective,186 in order to deanonymize a user, all of the proxies that relay that 
user’s communication must collude. From a traffic analysis perspective, 
anonymity in Tor can be compromised if both the first and last relays 
collude.187 This weaker protection (or stronger trust model) is due to the 
difficulty of anonymizing web traffic: the first and last relays can identify that 
they are routing the same connection—even if from a protocol perspective they 
cannot match circuit identifiers—by comparing and correlating the start and end 
time of a connection and the number of packets transmitted within it.188 Recent 
research in anonymous communications proposes refining Tor’s trust model by 
allowing users to take into account in their relay selection the trust that they 
place in different relay operators.189 
An important requirement for achieving effective protection is that the 
relays must be located in different geographic locations around the globe. This 
is necessary to ensure diversity of jurisdictions and of ISPs in order to prevent 
end-to-end tracing of connections.190 If a single ISP or network operator who 
controls an Autonomous System191 could observe a connection coming both in 
and out of the Tor network, that entity would be able to link the end points of 
the connection by correlating traffic characteristics such as start and end 
connection timing or number of packets.192 For this reason, the routing policy of 
Tor does not allow choice of more than one relay within a given IP subnet.193 
This also means, however, that Tor cannot guarantee anonymity towards 
entities that have the power to monitor Internet communications on a global 
scale, as the case may be for powerful signals intelligence organizations, such 
as the NSA and GCHQ.194 The leaked NSA reports indicate, however, that even 
these organizations have so far not been able to fully exploit the information at 
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their disposal (from multiple sources, including corrupted Tor nodes and fiber 
optic cables) to de-anonymize a large fraction of Tor users.195 
Tor aims to protect not only its users but also its relay operators, who are 
often volunteers. Relay operators may be (legally) compelled to reveal 
cryptographic keys or decrypt a (past) communication of interest to law 
enforcement. To avoid such situations, the Tor protocols establish ephemeral 
session keys with forward security properties,196 meaning that relays are unable 
to decrypt a communication after it has terminated.  
The need for forward security is best illustrated by the case of anon.penet.fi, 
an early pseudonymous email system that operated in Finland in the 1990s.197 
Anon.penet.fi had a simple design with a single proxy that kept a table of 
correspondence matching pseudonyms and email addresses.198 In 1996, a 
plaintiff claimed that a user of anon.penet.fi had sent a message to a newsgroup 
infringing its copyright.199 A court ordered the administrator of anon.penet.fi to 
unveil the identity of the user concerned.200 The administrator, whose reputation 
had already been damaged by reports that the service was used to disseminate 
child pornography, decided to shut down anon.penet.fi, fearing it could no 
longer guarantee users’ anonymity.201 
Finally, Tor also provides a platform for offering hidden services—whose 
location or IP address cannot be determined—which can be accessed 
anonymously by other users.202 In some cases, hidden services facilitate 
important public policy goals such as freedom of speech by Iranian bloggers, 
whose blogs would otherwise be blocked by state-sponsored denial of service 
attacks. Other examples of hidden services include anonymous blogs, 
decentralized instant messaging applications such as TorChat,203 and services 
for safely sharing information with journalists, such as the New Yorker’s 
Strongbox.204 Disturbingly, hidden services are also known to facilitate 
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malevolent activity. The Silk Road205 was a large online black market operated 
as a Tor hidden server. An estimated 70% of the ten thousand products for sale 
by Silk Road vendors were illegal drugs.206 Law enforcement officials often 
complained that the security of Tor made it impossible to crack down on such 
illegal activities, and called for the introduction of backdoors in Tor to make 
law enforcement work possible. After operating for more than two and a half 
years, the Silk Road was taken down by the FBI on October 2, 2013. Reports on 
the FBI investigation indicate that it was traditional detective work that led to 
the successful arrest of the Silk Road operator, rather than an attack on the Tor 
network.207 Another recent high-profile example is that of Freedom Hosting, a 
web hosting service also implemented as a Tor hidden server that the FBI 
characterized as the “largest facilitator of child porn on the planet.”208 The FBI 
took down the service and arrested its operator in August 2013. According to 
news reports, the FBI conducted a targeted attack that exploited a vulnerability 
in the Freedom Hosting server, without compromising the Tor network.209 
These two cases emphasize that human intelligence (HUMINT), detective work, 
and targeted operations can lead to law enforcement successes, even if anti-
surveillance technologies are in use. At the same time, these methods do not 
facilitate low-cost mass surveillance. 
With respect to its transparency practices, Tor makes both its protocols and 
open source software available for public review. This is necessary to build trust 
and ensure that there are no backdoors built into the system, which could 
compromise the anonymity of Tor users. Indeed, Tor is likely the PET subject 
to the most detailed scrutiny of privacy researchers, with dozens of research 
papers published over the past decade analyzing its security, reporting 
vulnerabilities, and proposing design improvements.210 Such engagement by a 
community of experts is crucial to ensure that the system is continuously 
updated and improved.  
The leaked NSA documents outline the various strategies that the NSA 
employed to try to de-anonymize Tor users.211 None of these strategies have 
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come as a surprise to the privacy research community, as the attacks had 
already been independently discovered and published by academic researchers 
and were thus publicly known. In fact, in several instances the attacks and 
vulnerabilities known to the academic research community appear to be more 
sophisticated than those actually considered by the NSA. The Tor Project notes 
in its blog,  
Despite the understandable concern provoked among users by these 
disclosures, Tor developers themselves were encouraged by the often relatively 
basic or out-of-date nature of the attacks described. In response to one 
journalist’s request for comment, Roger Dingledine wrote that “we still have a 
lot of work to do to make Tor both safe and usable, but we don’t have any new 
work based on these slides.”212 
D. Policy Implications 
Information privacy law applies obligations mainly to data controllers. 
Hence, the policy implications of the foregoing debate depend on the relevant 
category of PETs, which corresponds to the degree of engagement by a data 
controller. 
With respect to the first category, consisting of PETs that require adoption 
by a data controller, policymakers should incentivize and in appropriate cases 
require implementation of PETs into the design of infrastructures, products, and 
services. This should be viewed as appropriate application of the principle of 
“Privacy by Design.”213 In cases where PETs can enhance individuals’ privacy 
without sacrificing any of the functionalities and stated, i.e., primary, goals of 
the data controller, they should be mandated.214 This is particularly the case in 
the context of infrastructures that are effectively mandatory for individuals, i.e., 
where the service provider enjoys monopoly power either de jure—as in the 
case of utilities, highways, and voting systems—or de facto—as in the case of 
the mobile infrastructure.  
To be sure, some Big Data evangelists would argue that more data is 
always better, if only for reasons to be determined at a later date; in which case 
any data minimization could be viewed as sacrificing potential future benefit. 
Yet, surely such a view is more religious than it is scientific. As Julie Cohen 
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puts it: “[S]ome of the claims on behalf of Big Data, those framed in terms of a 
‘singularity’ waiting in our soon-to-be-realized future, sound quasi-religious, 
conjuring up the image of throngs of dyed-in-the-wool rationalists awaiting 
digital rapture.”215 
Suffice it to say that the jury is still out with respect to the efficiency and 
efficacy of a “collect it now, decide what to do with it later” approach, as 
opposed to more conventional data collection practices. It remains to be proven 
that unbarred collection is an effective strategy, much less a cost-effective one, 
accounting not only for big data rewards, but also for attendant privacy risks. 
Indeed, there is no inherent reason that big data practices cannot benefit from 
employing the same principles that inform PETs, namely data minimization, 
avoiding a single point of failure, and opening the algorithms to public scrutiny. 
In fact, researchers can, or are, already looking into the application of these 
design principles in big data scenarios. This includes, for example, studying the 
marginal benefit of collection and processing of certain attributes for 
personalization relative to the risks accrued, where similar personalization can 
be offered with much less data collection. Further, researchers are already 
exploring ways of opening big data algorithms to scrutiny, especially with 
respect to re-identification of individuals, discrimination, and fairness.216 These 
research efforts may eventually mitigate some of the risks associated with big 
data to help develop accountable and more democratically organized models of 
data collection and processing. 
The role of government and regulation in promoting PET innovation is 
particularly important where businesses would have to incur costs in order to 
introduce privacy-friendly services. As discussed above, current technological 
architectures often permit “surveillance by default, privacy by effort,”217 and 
businesses see little benefit in implementing costly mechanisms that are not 
duly understood and acknowledged by consumers. For businesses to listen, 
consumers need to not only know and understand the benefits of PETs, but also 
to threaten to revolt or leave the system en masse if privacy protective 
mechanisms are not provided.218 
PETs seek to “restore” the previous balance common in the “analogue 
world” of private by default, public—and therefore available for surveillance—
by sometimes insurmountable effort. Similarly, regulatory intervention is 
warranted where intrusive systems create additional revenue streams and 
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 216 Id. at 1932.  
 217 danah boyd, Making Sense of Privacy and Publicity, Keynote Address at SXSW, 
Austin, Tex. (Mar. 13, 2010) (“Historically, a conversation that you might have in the 
hallway is private by default, public through effort . . . . Conversely, when you engage online 
in equally public settings such as on someone’s Facebook Wall, the conversation is public 
by default, private through effort.”). 
 218 See Cuijpers & Koops, supra note 118, at 270. For a discussion of political dissent in 
Israel against the creation of a national biometric scheme, see Who We Are, NO2BIO.ORG, 
http://no2bio.org/about.  
2013] DATA CONTROLLER IN PRIVACY LAW 961 
 
business opportunities, further disincentivizing privacy innovation. This is 
particularly the case in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, where the relevant 
players do not compete on privacy, or at all. At the same time, it takes two to 
tango: governments themselves benefit from businesses’ data collection zeal. In 
fact, where businesses fail to maximize their collection potential, governments 
are known to compel them to collect and retain consumers’ information.219  
In order to draw the information privacy framework closer to first principles 
and constitutional doctrine, PETs should be deployed far more extensively than 
they are today. Should government be interested in promoting PETs, it would 
have multiple ways to “nudge” business, including through requirements in bids 
for government contracts, provision of privacy compliance safe harbors, and 
integration into data protection regulation. Similarly, public sector institutions 
could be required to adopt PETs, at least in areas monopolized by the 
government. 
The second category includes PETs that are utilized by a user to access a 
service offered by a data controller. Here, policymakers should discourage, or 
in appropriate cases, prevent the blocking of or tampering with PETs by the 
controller. One argument data controllers raise to defend self-imposed 
restrictions on PETs is that they are bad for business. Yet, various regulatory 
tools such as competition law—in highly concentrated markets220—or the 
doctrine of unfairness (under the FTC’s Section 5 authority in the United 
States221 or standard form contract law in the EU222) may help fend off such 
claims. As long as the data minimization principle is not written off, consumers 
should have a right to restrict the extent of data they share with service 
providers to the minimum amount necessary for conducting a transaction.  
To take one example, search engines have strong incentives to block 
TrackMeNot.223 The use of dummy queries not only makes them consume 
(“waste”224) resources; but it also “pollutes” their databases of profiles with 
“noise,” devaluing their quality and consequently diminishing the effectiveness 
at targeted advertising, which is an important element of their business 
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model.225 In response to these criticisms, Nissenbaum argues that PETs such as 
TrackMeNot are legitimate as a “weapon of the weak,” given the asymmetries 
of power and knowledge between controllers and users.226 Users have few 
options to protect themselves from profiling other than using PETs such as 
TrackMeNot or Tor as legal protections are weak and opt-out mechanisms 
complex and unreliable.  
Controllers can forbid in their terms of service the use of PETs that provide 
content encryption, anonymous access, or data obfuscation. Nissenbaum argues, 
though, that the law should authorize users to violate unfair terms of service, 
which are unilaterally imposed contracts of adhesion.227 Thus, the use of such 
PETs may be viewed as a form of civil disobedience that expresses discontent 
with respect to existing profiling and surveillance practices.  
With respect to the third category of PETs, consisting of collaborative 
applications without a central data controller, policymakers should protect the 
ability of individuals to work together to fend off surveillance. At the very least, 
such PETs should not be made illegal.228  
Data controllers can stifle the use of such PETs through restrictions in their 
terms of service, changes to APIs, traffic management, and more. They often 
justify such disruptions based on a common view of PET users being inherently 
suspicious of untoward activity, i.e., individuals who have “something to 
hide.”229 Yet this is just another facet of the “nothing to hide” argument, which 
has been dispelled time and again in privacy literature.230 Not only terrorists 
and pedophiles have “something to hide.”231 So do human rights activists, 
dissidents and—more generally—privacy-aware individuals who are 
increasingly concerned about being monitored, profiled, and singled out for 
unique treatment by algorithmic machines.232 With privacy protected as a 
fundamental human right in Europe and recognized as a building block of a free 
society in the United States, the depiction of privacy-aware individuals as 
potential criminals is perverse. To be sure, some wrongdoers will seek to take 
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advantage of privacy protections, but we do not bring mass transit systems to a 
halt simply because they sometimes transport criminals or contraband. 
Similarly, it would be disproportionate to discredit PETs for the transgressions 
of a few. 
Moreover, it is untenable to require PET developers to build surveillance-
ready backdoors into the technology’s design. Such backdoors would defeat the 
very purpose of PETs, which is to protect individuals from surveillance. Worse 
yet, they would undermine the security and trust in information communications 
technology and open the door not only to law enforcement agencies but also to 
unintended government, business or individual intruders.233 In a similar vein, 
application of data retention requirements to anonymous systems such as Tor 
would render such systems useless. Here too, strong stakeholders will argue that 
toughening PETs is a boon to terrorists and criminals. Such arguments, 
however, have already been raised—and ultimately discarded—in the context of 
the “crypto wars” of the 1990s.234 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional privacy protections treat centralized power with distrust and 
require effective checks, balances, and safeguards against government 
surveillance. Over the past two decades, as individuals’ daily lives have become 
increasingly mediated by technologies, government institutions have enhanced 
their surveillance powers through tightening collaboration with private sector 
entities, to create a “surveillant assemblage.” Findings about the extent of 
government and private sector surveillance have recently reached the zenith 
with the constant drumbeat of revelations about the NSA and GCHQ. 
Information privacy law, a legal framework arising in the 1970s to protect 
individuals’ data privacy, provides little protection against such surveillance 
risks. This relatively new legal framework bridges two distinct trust paradigms: 
one assuming that data controllers are trusted entities, the other assuming that, 
in a similar vein to the constitutional framework, data controllers should be 
treated with suspicion and distrust. Over the past few years, the legal framework 
has shifted from focusing on data minimization, a cornerstone of the untrusted 
controller model, to imposing information stewardship obligations on data 
controllers who are increasingly viewed as custodians of individuals’ rights. 
These obligations, typically grouped under the title “accountability,” are based 
on a notion of the data controller as a trusted party.  
In stark contrast, the technological community researching PETs proceeds 
from a diametrically opposed perception of a data controller, that of an 
adversary. Under this approach, information disclosed to a data controller is 
compromised and can no longer be viewed as private, given that a data 
controller itself may subject individuals to persistent surveillance.  
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This Article argues that the emergence and growth of the surveillant 
assemblage, particularly in light of recent revelations, heightens the importance 
of the untrusted controller paradigm for information privacy law. The law 
should not assume that data controllers are trustworthy; rather, it should 
promote—or at the very least not prevent—the deployment of PETs, defined as 
technological privacy solutions that combine three principles: elimination of the 
single point of failure inherent with any centralized trusted party; data 
minimization; and subjecting protocols and software to community based public 
scrutiny.  
To better tailor this policy recommendation to real world scenarios, this 
Article proposes a categorization of PETs based on the role of the data 
controller, who is the focal point for application of information privacy law. 
The first category would include PETs that require active implementation by a 
data controller. Here, policymakers should incentivize and, in appropriate cases, 
require implementation of PETs into the design of infrastructures, products, and 
services. This should be the case particularly in monopolistic or oligopolistic 
markets or services provided by the public sector, where there is little 
competition on the basis of privacy.  
The second category consists of client-side software deployed by a user to 
access a service offered by a data controller. Here, policymakers should 
discourage, or in appropriate cases prevent the blocking of or tampering with 
PETs by the controller. This should be the case even where businesses argue 
that PETs interfere with their business models or lay costly resources to waste. 
PETs should be viewed as a “weapon of the weak,” providing individuals with 
minimal capabilities necessary to assert their legal and constitutional 
protections. 
The third category consists of PETs that are collaborative applications 
without a data controller, such as the Tor network. At the very least, such PETs 
should not be made illegal. Optimally, service providers should be required to 
interact with PETs’ users without blocking or delegitimizing their privacy 
choices through restricted APIs or unilaterally imposed contractual terms. In 
addition, PET developers should not be compelled to build surveillance-ready 
backdoors into the technology’s design or to comply with data retention 
requirements, as such obligations would render the PETs unusable.  
The information privacy framework can use PETs to refocus on the core 
concerns that have led to its introduction into legislation across the globe, after 
decades of ominous government data abuses leveraged to persecute citizens, 
minorities, and political dissidents. 
